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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 
 
1.1  Background 
The South African Constitution1 places a high importance on ‘equality’. Section 8 of the 
Constitution affirms this by providing that the Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds all 
organs of the state.2 ‘Equality’ is the general principle established in section 9(1) of the 
Constitution to combat the continuance of apartheid inequalities, which caused the majority of 
black South African people, whether African, Indian, or Coloured, to suffer disparities in wealth 
and privilege and also divisions in employment. Section 9(1) of the Constitution entitles people 
to the equal treatment, protection, and benefit of the law.3 To resolve the aforementioned 
disparities, section 9(2) of the Constitution allows for legislative and other measures designed to 
advance historically disadvantaged people. What the latter section does not suggest is that the 
measures contemplated may advance some people while they diminish other people, thus 
inevitably coming into conflict with section 9(1) of the Constitution. Section 9(3) and 9(4) of the 
Constitution prohibits the state and private persons from unfairly discriminating against anyone.4 
Combating unfair discrimination is the state’s prerogative through national legislation.5 
However, discrimination may be permitted in some instances.6 
 It is generally held that affirmative action is one instance in which such discrimination is 
permitted.7 Affirmative action is a policy that promotes suitably qualified people from 
historically disadvantaged groups in order to afford them equal opportunities.  In the context of 
South African Employment Legislation, however, affirmative action is taken a step further in 
that it is also required to ensure that historically disadvantaged groups are equitably represented 
in all units and levels of employment.8 In other words, there is a requirement for substantive 
‘equality’ comprising ‘equitable representation’ to result from the affirmative action procedure.9 
                                                          
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996(hereinafter referred to as the Constitution). 
2 Section 8(1) of the Constitution. 
3 See section 2.2 in Chapter 2. 
4 Section 9 of the Constitution will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 2 below. 
5 Section 9(4) of the Constitution. 
6 Section 9(5) of the Constitution. 
7 Munsamy v Minister of Safety and Security (2013) 7 BLLR 695 (LC) para 18. 
8 Section 15(1) of the EEA.  
9 M McGregor “Blowing the whistle?: the future of affirmative action in South Africa (part 1)” (2014) 6 SAMLJ 60, 
71. 
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‘Equitable representation’ means that the staff composition of a designated employer must 
consist of all race groups mirrored in the national demographic profile.10 Section 15(1) of the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) in providing for affirmative action measures state the 
following: 
“Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from 
‘designated groups’ have equal employment opportunities and are suitably and are equitably 
represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workplace of a designated employer.” 
 
Demographic representivity is such an affirmative action measure. Demographic representivity is 
a standard that requires all state and private institutions,11 and organised spheres of people to be 
broadly reflective of the national population’s race profile.12 The African National Congress 
(ANC) government adopted this concept as policy.13 Gwede Mantashe, the ANC Secretary 
General, commenting on the Employment Equity Amendment Bill, notes that: 
“The amendment is meant to give employers flexibility of using either national or provincial 
demographics as long as they can justify their preference… A national company will be expected 
to use national demographics and a provincially based company will be expected to use 
provincial demographics.” 
 
Thus, it can be argued that the concept of demographic representivity indirectly introduces 
quotas in the South African labour market. Furthermore, whether a company is nationally or 
provincially based, employment always occurs locally as far as employees are concerned. 
Therefore the result of using national demographics to regulate quotas can result in a situation 
which is completely distorted to the prejudice of certain race groups who are not evenly 
represented throughout the country. For example, the current percentage of Coloureds in the 
Western Cape is 52.4%, but their job quota would be only 10.6% according to the mechanism, 
even in the Western Cape where they are in the majority.14 Similarly, in KwaZulu-Natal, where 
the current percentage of Indians is 10.6%, their job quota would be only 3.1%.15 
                                                          
10 K Malan “Observations on representivity, democracy and homogenisation” (2010) 3 TSAR 427, 430. 
11 Demographic representivity is also applicable to designated employers in the private sector. 
12 Malan (note 10 above) 427. 
13 ANC “Affirmative Action and the New Constitution” (1994) 1, available at 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=283, accessed on 03 February 2015. 
14 Statistics South Africa Quarterly Labour Force Survey 3 (2014), quoted on page xiv of the 14th Commission for 
Employment Equity Annual Report 2013 – 2014. 
15 Ibid. 
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Whilst affirmative action is itself constitutional, it is less clear that the concept of demographic 
representivity envisaged by the EEA passes constitutional muster. It should be noted that there 
are problems of unfairness and therefore unfair discrimination in regard to any system requiring 
quotas, which will be dealt with in detail below.16 Indeed, the EEA expressly prohibits the use of 
quotas in the workplace,17  but it provides for numerical goals to be put in place, a concept 
difficult to distinguish from quotas. This potential contradiction notwithstanding, affirmative 
action with the inclusion of provision for demographic representivity as provided for in the EEA 
has been characterised by the courts as valuable.18 However, before its recent amendment, 
section 42 of the EEA contained compliance factors which ameliorated the potentially unfair 
effect of demographic representivity requirements,19 which probably accounts for its acceptance 
by the courts. In particular, when hiring or promoting employees to ensure the ‘equitable 
representation’ of suitably qualified job aspirants from ‘designated groups’ section 42 required 
designated employers20 to adopt numerical targets that were flexible in application, with the 
consideration of a pool of factors.21 Amendments to the EEA were expected to provide a better 
solution concerning the provision of affirmative action benefits.22   
However, the recently promulgated Employment Equity Amendment Act of 201323 (EEAA) 
having substituted the above-mentioned  section 42 assessment factors, sanctions the use of a 
type of demographic representivity which employs rigid population percentages to apportion job 
quotas per race group.24 Thus, the EEAA threatens to create unfair discrimination within the 
South African labour market by enforcing the concept of demographic representivity with little 
                                                          
16 See 4.3 in Chapter 4; 5.3 in Chapter 5. 
17 See Section 15(3) of the EEA. 
18 Minister of Finance and Another v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) para 102.  
19 See 4.2.3 in Chapter 4. 
20 Section 1 of the EEA defines a designated employer as “an employer who employs 50 or more employees;  an 
employer who employs fewer than 50 employees, but has a total annual turnover that is equal to or above the 
applicable annual turnover of a small business in terms of Schedule 4 to this Act;  a municipality, as referred to in 
Chapter 7 of the Constitution; an organ of state as defined in section 239 of the Constitution, but excluding local 
spheres of government, the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret 
Service; and  an employer bound by a collective agreement in terms of section 23 or 31 of the Labour Relations Act, 
which appoints it as a designated employer in terms of this Act, to the extent provided for in the agreement 
[emphasis added].” 
21 Section 1 of the EEA defined ‘designated groups’ as “black people, women and people with disabilities” before it 
was amended by the Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013. 
22 See item 2 of the Memorandum on the Objects of the Employment Equity Amendment Bill 2012. 
23 Act 47 of 2013. 
24 AM Louw “Extrapolating ‘equality’ from the Letter of the Law: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Affirmative 
Action under the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998” (2006) 18 SAMLJ 336, 337. 
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or no flexibility. In particular, section 16 of the EEAA, in providing for a mechanism for 
assessing the compliance of designated employers with employment equity obligations, allows 
employers to select either national or regional race population percentages, although the 
application of regional population percentages will almost always be the fairest approach to 
adopt.  This applies to the public or private sector.25 It will be argued that the requirement of 
section 16 of the EEAA to consider race population percentages in relation to the composition of 
the workforce indirectly imposes the impermissible quota system.26 Therefore the concept of 
demographic representivity which section 16 of the EEAA provides for may be unconstitutional. 
1.2  Research problem and literature review 
The EEA expressly prohibited quotas.27 However, much affirmative action legislation, as well as 
the practical application of affirmative action, has been based on the concept of ‘demographic 
representivity’.28 In respect of employment in the public sector, demographic representivity has 
been used as a method of transformation, however this practice has been challenged in the case 
of Solidarity obo Barnard v South African Police Service.29 Notwithstanding this challenge, the 
concept of demographic representivity is specifically provided for in terms of section 16 by the 
EEAA that provides that both national and the regional economically active population profiles 
may be considered when determining the extent to which various race groups are represented in 
the labour market.30 The effect of section 16 of the EEAA is to render section 42 of the EEA of 
1998 obsolete and to substitute it with a new standard of compliance factors that imposes a rigid 
type of demographic representivity.  
The question arises whether demographic representivity as an affirmative action policy is 
constitutional, given the fundamental commitment of section 9 of the South African Constitution. 
Furthermore, the concept of demographic representivity raises questions of fairness and 
practicality.31  
                                                          
25 See section 16 of the EEEAA. 
26 See section 5.3.3 in Chapter 5. 
27 Note 17 above. 
28 Malan (note 10 above) 428. 
29 2014 (2) SA 1 (SCA) para 81. 
30 See section 5.2.2 in Chapter 5. 
31 Minister of Finance and another v Van Heerden (note 18 above) para 39. 
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Equating representivity to ‘equality’ is held as an objective means of achieving ‘equality’ in the 
South African labour market.32 Malan, commenting on the use of the concept of representivity in 
both the EEA and the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act33 as a method of 
transformation, observes that representivity and ‘equality’ can be seen to have become two 
equals. He notes in this regard that representivity should in fact rather be a prerequisite for the 
achievement of ‘equality’.34 Malan’s view complements that of Van der Westhuizen J in Stoman 
v Minister of Safety and Security35 that “efficiency and representivity, or ‘equality’, should, 
however not be viewed as separate competing or even opposing arms.” Adopting a contrasting 
view, Louw considering transformation in the South African sports field, noted that 
representivity has superseded ‘equality’.36 Despite these differing views, both Louw and Malan’s 
observations point to the fact that representivity has become the new strategy of achieving 
‘equality’.  
Whether representivity can practically be equated to ‘equality’ in the South African labour 
market is a question that still needs to be answered.37 Equating representivity to ‘equality’ 
however negates the entitlement to fairness because the standard of ‘equality’ introduced 
requires the application of substantive ‘equality’, a notion that focusses only on advancing 
historically disadvantaged people. Giving rise to substantive ‘equality’, affirmative action, 
through the mechanisation of the concept of demographic representivity create new patterns of 
disadvantage by excluding other historically disadvantaged groups while benefitting mostly 
Africans, who are a majority in South Africa.38 Representivity also creates impediments for the 
appointment of white people in contravention of section 9(2) of the Constitution that requires 
measures to be adopted that are designed to promote the achievement of ‘equality’.39 Venter40 
asserts that the concept of demographic representivity inevitably comes into conflict with the 
                                                          
32 Malan (note 10 above) 446. 
33 Act 53 of 2003. 
34 Malan (note 10 above) 446. 
35 (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T) para 482. 
36 AM Louw “Should the playing field be levelled? Revisiting affirmative action in professional sport” 2004 
Stellenbosch LR 409, 419. 
37 See section 4.3 in Chapter 4. 
38 Malan (note 10 above) 447. 
39 See section 9(2) of the Constitution. 
40 F Venter “The limitations of restitutionary equality” (2004) 7 PELJ 1. 
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constitutional value of ‘equality’. Thus, demographic representivity, a mechanism of affirmative 
action cannot be sustained if it runs counter to the value of ‘equality’. 
An ideal model of an affirmative action measure would be one that affords all citizens equal 
opportunities, taking into account various options available.41 However, the concept of 
demographic representivity seems to be a reactionary measure targeted at punishing the white 
minority for apartheid transgressions as opposed to a genuine process of achieving equity. 
Mildred Oliphant, the Minister of Labour hinted on the motive behind the drafting of the EEAA 
in her speech to the National Council of Provinces as follows: 
“Unfortunately employers have refused or are unwilling to make a leap of faith with regards to 
transformation. Reports received from employers over the past 15 years clearly show that not 
much progress has been made. Whites and males, particularly White males, continue to dominate 
in the middle to upper echelons of organisations, according to the report by the Commission for 
Employment Equity for 2012 reporting period… It is clear that legislation has not induced any 
serious transformation in the upper echelons where real decisions are taken. It is also that the 
patterns as noted above will not lead to any different results any time soon. The current 
amendments for EE, therefore could not have come at a better time.”42 
 
It is common cause that the right to ‘equality’ is subject to limitations.43 However, less restrictive 
means could be used to safeguard against infringements that would render the whole essence of 
remedial measures unconstitutional. When the EEA was initially enacted, the legislature 
disregarded the possibility of affirmative action becoming discriminatory itself.  
While Louw44 and other scholars45 criticise the notion of demographic representivity, much of 
their emphasis has been on the practicality of demographic representivity in the South African 
labour market. Their argument may be considered to be lacking a detailed exploration regarding 
the constitutionality of the concept of demographic representivity in the labour market. Thus, the 
question remains whether the concept of demographic representivity is a constitutionally 
acceptable affirmative action practice. 
                                                          
41 See T Cohen and L Moodley “Achieving Decent Work in South Africa?” (2012) 15 PER 320, 325, these options 
include furthering the education and skills of historically disadvantaged people and increasing the job creation 
capacity of the government. 
42 Mildred Oliphant, Speech on the Employment Equity Amendment Bill to the National Council of Provinces, Cape 
Town, 21 November 2013. 
43 Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
44 Louw (note 24 above) 338. 
45 Malan (note 10 above) 447; Venter (note 40 above) 1. 
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In order to answer this question the following research questions will be addressed in the 
dissertation. 
1.3  Research questions 
 
The research questions that will be answered by the dissertation are as follows: 
 
1. To what extent are affirmative action and the mechanism of demographic 
representivity limited in terms of the Constitution; and in what circumstances does 
demographic representivity amount to unfair discrimination? 
 
2. What provision was made for demographic representivity in the EEA 55 of 1998 and 
what were the legal and practical effects of this provision? 
 
3. What provision is made for demographic representivity in the EEAA 47 of 2013 and 
what are the legal, constitutional and practical effects of this provision? 
 
1.4  Research aim 
The aim of this study is to clarify the scope and limits of the concept of demographic 
representivity in the South African labour market. To the ANC and the Legislature, demographic 
representivity has appeared to be the most realistic method of remedying divisions in 
employment caused by systematic discrimination against the majority of black South African 
people, which occurred in the past. However, the concept of demographic representivity has 
potential negative effects with regard to unfair discrimination in the South African labour 
market. Despite the prevalence of disputes concerning the application of demographic 
representivity in the labour market, it has proved difficult to challenge the concept because it is 
often applied under the guise of implementing the permissible numerical goals. As the recent 
EEAA46 appears to remove safeguards which previously legitimised demographic 
representivity,47 its constitutionality needs to be interrogated. However, the opportunity also 
arises to investigate whether the concept of demographic representivity negates the right to 
‘equality’ in the labour market ab initio.  
                                                          
46 Note 23 above. 
47 Note 25 above. 
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1.5  Research outline 
In order to achieve the aim stated above, given the overriding protection afforded by the right to 
‘equality’ in the Constitution, the dissertation will analyse the constitutional acceptability of 
demographic representivity. This is done in order to establish whether the concept is a 
permissible affirmative action practice considering the prohibition placed by section 9(3) of the 
Constitution against race-based discrimination. Also considering that constitutional interpretation 
is not limited to individual sections in the Constitution, guidance is sought from other provisions 
in the Constitution that provide for representivity. Thereafter the legal and practical effects of 
demographic representivity provided for in terms of the EEA are discussed. Moreover, the 
motivation behind the drafting of the EEAA is established and the legal and practical effects of 
demographic representivity provided for in terms of that Act48 are considered. Having considered 
the abovementioned aspects, a conclusion will be drawn. 
1.6  Conclusion 
The achievement of ‘equality’ is one of the founding values established by section 1 of the 
Constitution.49 A number of contraventions have been noted that contradict the right to ‘equality’ 
entrenched in section 9 of the Constitution. Thus, the following chapter will provide a critical 
analysis of demographic representivity in relation to section 9 of the Constitution and the 
constitutional founding values created by Chapter 1 of the Constitution being human dignity, the 
achievement of ‘equality’, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism 








                                                          
48 Note 23 above. 
49 Section 1(a) of the Constitution. 
50 Section 1 of the Constitution. 
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CHAPTER 2: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Because of the history of South Africa with its racial divisions, ‘equality’ is of paramount 
importance. The principle of ‘equality’ provides that people who are in the same position must 
be treated alike.51 Moreover, the achievement of equality is one of the core values of the 
Constitution.52 These founding values are the underlying principles that govern the interpretation 
of all obligations created by the Constitution. The achievement of ‘equality’ is one such 
obligation created by section 9 of the Constitution.53 Despite this, the Constitutional Court (CC) 
jurisprudence seems to have taken a course that isolates affirmative action from the general 
‘equality’ guarantee and the rest of the Constitution.54 This approach appears to infringe on 
constitutional values and affects the ability of the lower courts to resolve affirmative action 
disputes rationally and fairly.55 Affirmative action derives from substantive ‘equality’, a notion 
that recognises group disadvantage and determines the allocation of employment opportunities 
based on the social and historical backgrounds of people or groups of people.56 Affirmative 
action measures are designed to give effect to substantive ‘equality’.  
The concept of demographic representivity, a widespread mechanism of affirmative action is one 
such affirmative action measure. What needs to be established is whether the concept of 
demographic representivity is a permissible affirmative action measure constitutionally.  
2.2  Section 9(1) of the Constitution 
Formal ‘equality’ is the general notion provided in section 9(1) of the Constitution and it requires 
that people who are similarly placed be treated alike.57 Section 9 of the Constitution reads as 
follows: 
                                                          
51 S Fredman Discrimination Law (2001) 16.   
52 Note 49 above. 
53 Section 9(1) of the Constitution. 
54 JL Pretorius “Fairness in transformation: A critique of the Constitutional Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence” 
(2010) 26 SAJHR 536. 
55 Ibid.   
56 McGregor (note 9 above) 71. 
57 I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 223. 
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(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law.58 
 
Section 9(1) of the Constitution provides that every person is entitled to equal treatment 
regardless of their attributes and characteristics.59 Accordingly, any differential treatment of 
people for the purposes of section 9(1) would usually amount to unfair discrimination in terms of 
section 9(3) of the Constitution.60 The Constitution affirms human dignity, the achievement of 
‘equality’, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, in a non-racialist and non-sexist 
society as underlying values on which the South African society is found.61 These underlying 
principles must govern the interpretation of rights created by the Constitution.62 However, an 
‘equality’ ideology that is purely based on formal ‘equality’ has been considered problematic for 
the South African society which still bears the scars of apartheid. From these perceived 
shortcomings of the notion of formal ‘equality’, the notion of substantive ‘equality’ was born.63 
The notion of substantive ‘equality’ considers the social and historical status of people or groups 
of people in order to determine whether the constitutional obligation to achieve ‘equality’ is 
being fulfilled.64 However, substantive ‘equality’ is not an exception to the right to ‘equality’ and 
affirmative action measures that are adopted in order to achieve substantive ‘equality’ must 
comply with section 9 of the Constitution as a whole.65  
2.3  The constitutional standard of affirmative action measures 
Section 9(2) of the Constitution provides as follows: 
“Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of ‘equality’, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons 
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken [my own 
emphasis].” 
                                                          
58 Note 53 above. 
59 Currie & De Waal (note 57 above) 213. 
60 Ibid 222. 
61 Note 50 above. 
62 Currie & De Waal (note 57 above) 211. 
63 McGregor (note 9 above) 70. 
64 M McGregor “Judicial notice: Discrimination and disadvantage in the context of affirmative action in South 
African workplaces” (2011) 1 De Jure 111, 113. 
65 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 74. 
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The first part of section 9(2) of the Constitution requires that affirmative action measures must 
uplift the promotion of ‘equality’ by guaranteeing every person the enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms that are bestowed on them by the ‘equality’ protection under section 9(1) of the 
Constitution. Thus, the legislature in enacting any legislation that is directed at protecting and 
advancing people who were susceptible to past discrimination, should ensure that such measures 
do not impugn the rights of those excluded from their benefit.66 
The second part of section 9(2) provides a limited exception to the general principle set by the 
first part of section 9(2), that ‘equality’ must “include the full and equal enjoyment of all rights 
and freedoms.” Thus the affirmative action provision provided in the second part of section 9(2) 
of the Constitution is not an end in itself and should be interpreted in a restricted manner subject 
to the first part.67 The concept of demographic representivity is one such mechanism of 
affirmative action utilised by the EEA to advance people who were susceptible to past 
discrimination which may give rise to further inequalities. Thus, the constitutionality of the 
concept has to be tested. A threefold enquiry was formulated in Minister of Finance and Another 
v Van Heerden68 for the purpose of testing the legitimacy of affirmative action measures under 
section 9(2) of the Constitution. The three enquiries that must be satisfied are:   
 whether the measure targets persons or categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination. 
 whether the measure is designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of persons. 
 whether the measure promotes the achievement of ‘equality’.69  
In Van Heerden,70 Moseneke J stated that remedial measures that pass the internal test of section 
9(2) cannot be presumed unfair, even though they may differentiate between people based on 
grounds listed in section 9(3) of the Constitution. Section 9(3) of the Constitution reads as 
follows: 
“The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.” 
                                                          
66 Currie & De Waal (note 57 above) 241. 
67 Ibid. 
68 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) para 37. 
69 Minister of Finance and another v Van Heerden (note 18 above) para 37. 
70 Note 68 above, para 25. 
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The weakness of the Van Heerden ‘rationality test’ is that it legitimises a measure for merely 
passing its low threshold test even though that measure can disproportionately impact on those 
excluded from its benefits. However, Moseneke J’s assertion above points to the fact that those 
measures that are aimed at advancing the previously disadvantaged people but fail to pass the 
section 9(2) internal test can be presumed to be unfair in terms of section 9(5) of the Constitution 
read together with section 9(3).71  Each of the three stages of the Van Heerden enquiry are 
discussed in turn below to establish the legality of the concept of demographic representivity. 
2.3.1  The measure must target historically disadvantaged people 
The first requirement of the Van Heerden ‘stages of enquiry’ is that affirmative action measures 
must target historically disadvantaged people as their beneficiaries. Thus, the envisaged 
measures must have the object of preferring groups of people previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination.72 The EEA adopted ‘equitable representation’ as a means of achieving 
substantive ‘equality’, and to that effect utilises the concept of demographic representivity to 
reach this objective. The EEA’s aim is set out clearly in section 2 as achieving employment 
equity by: 
a) promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair 
discrimination; and 
b) implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in employment 
experienced by ‘designated groups’, in order to ensure their ‘equitable representation’ in all 
occupational categories and levels in the workforce. 
 
Section 15 of the EEA also provides that: 
(1) Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from 
‘designated groups’ have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all 
occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a designated employer.73 
 
The above-mentioned provisions makes the concept of demographic representivity comply with 
the first leg of the Van Heerden rationality test. This is because the concept targets groups of 
people which were susceptible to past unfair discrimination, namely, black people,74 women and 
                                                          
71 Minister of Finance and another v Van Heerden (note 18 above) para 24. 
72 Ibid para 38. 
73 Note 8 above. 
74 The term black people in terms of section 1 of the EEA include African, Coloured and Indian people. 
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disabled people.75 In Chinese Association of South Africa v The Minister of Labour,76 South 
African Chinese people were also declared to be black people for the purposes of section 1 of 
both the EEA and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (BEEA). 
This is because people of Chinese descent were classified as Coloureds during the apartheid era 
and to that effect fit within the definition of black people in terms of both the abovementioned 
Acts.77 
2.3.2  The measure must protect or advance a historically disadvantaged class 
The second requirement of Van Heerden78 is that an affirmative action measure must be designed 
to protect or advance classes of people previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. Thus, 
remedial measures should be capable of reasonably attaining a desired future goal.79 The only 
kind of disadvantage that should be considered in order for a person to be advanced under 
affirmative action measures is their history of past discrimination.  It is not adequate for an 
affirmative action measure to merely target historically disadvantaged people. The second leg of 
the Van Heerden test must complement the first leg by fulfilling the requirement to empower 
historically disadvantaged people. In Public Servants Association of South Africa and Others v 
Minister of Justice and Others,80 Swart J held that:  
“The measures must be designed to achieve something. This denotes . . . a causal connection 
between the designed measures and the objectives [emphasis added].” 
 
A rational connection must exist between an affirmative action measure and the purpose it seeks 
to achieve in order for that measure to be deemed legitimate for the purpose of section 9(2) of the 
Constitution.81 However, this requirement of a rational connection raises a question whether 
belonging to a group that suffered past disadvantage should automatically entitle a person to 
benefit under affirmative action measures. Logic dictates that an enquiry into individual 
disadvantage of people from historically disadvantaged groups is necessary before they can be 
                                                          
75 Section 1 of the EEA. 
76 (NDP) unreported case number 59251/2007 (18 June 2008) para 1. 
77  Lloyd Ramutloa “RE: Chinese Association of South Africa” Department of Labour 24 June 2008, available at 
http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media-desk/media-statements/2008/re-chinese-association-of-south-africa, accessed 
on 5 March 2015. 
78 Note 68 above, para 41. 
79 Minister of Finance and another v Van Heerden (note 18 above) para 41. 
80 1997 (3) SA 925 (T) para 989A-B. 
81 Minister of Finance and another v Van Heerden (note 18 above) para 42. 
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entitled to benefit under any affirmative action measures. Otherwise the failure to conduct such 
an enquiry can disadvantage those excluded by the measure. The facts of the case of Solidarity 
obo Barnard82 provides an example of such issues. In this matter Barnard, a suitably qualified 
white female police officer, was denied a promotion based on representivity, the post being 
reserved for Africans.83 Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand how Africans who had the 
privilege to reach the same rank as hers were classified as disadvantaged, and this shows 
practical problems associated with the use of past disadvantage as a criteria for people who are 
now advantaged. Moseneke ACJ held that the National Commissioner practiced his discretion 
rationally by not appointing Barnard, citing that such conduct was in line with the dictates of 
section 6(2) of the EEA to advance employment equity goals.84  The first two stages of the Van 
Heerden enquiry do not include a fairness test and the risk arises that an irrational and arbitrary 
measure can be capable of reaching its intended goals. 
Clearly the EEA’s concept of demographic representivity fulfils the second leg of the Van 
Heerden test. Support for this is to be found in section 15(3) of the EEA which reads as follows: 
“The measures85 referred to in subsection (2)(d) include preferential treatment and numerical 
goals, but exclude quotas.” 
 
To advance and promote groups of people that were susceptible to past unfair discrimination, 
preferential treatment of those groups and the use of numerical goals that are directed at 
increasing the representation of people from those groups is permitted.86 Numerical goals are set 
in an employment equity plan that is prepared after an analysis to determine the extent to which 
‘designated groups’ are underrepresented in all levels of the workforce.87 Representivity based 
on demographics informs the workforce analysis.88   
                                                          
82 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC). 
83 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC). para 201. 
84 Ibid para 69. 
85 Affirmative action measures. 
86 Section 15(3) of the EEA. 
87 Section 19(2) of the EEA. 
88 See section 16 of the EEA. 
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2.3.3  The measure must promote the achievement of ‘equality’ 
The third requirement in the Van Heerden89 test is that affirmative action measures must promote 
the achievement of ‘equality’, positive action being necessary for the redress of past inequalities. 
Thus, the perspective of a diverse society needs to be taken into account in executing remedial 
measures.90 There must be some degree of proportionality and fairness involved. Proportionality 
requires striking a balance between two equally important considerations, and that is, the 
decision to withhold a benefit from some people and the severity of such action.91 On the other 
hand rationality requires reasonableness when making decisions that may unfairly impact on 
those excluded by remedial measures.  
The concept of demographic representivity in terms of both the EEA and the EEAA does not 
promote the achievement of ‘equality’, the concept is an unfair mechanism which achieves 
directly the opposite of ‘equality’. Section 16 of the EEAA reads as follows: 
42. (1) In determining whether a designated employer is implementing employment equity in 
compliance with this Act, the Director-General or any person or body applying this Act may, in 
addition to the factors stated in section 15, take the following into account: 
(a) The extent to which suitably qualified people from and amongst the different ‘designated groups’ 
are equitably represented within each occupational level in that employer’s workforce in relation 
to the- demographic profile of the national and regional economically active population. 
 
The concept of demographic representivity requires the workforce of any designated employer to 
reflect the relative population of the national or regional profiles, and this is what is purported to 
be the achievement of ‘equality’. Rationality requires that if demographic representivity is to be 
regarded as a proxy of ‘equality’,92 a reasonable link must exist between the two concepts. There 
is no link whatsoever between the concept of demographic representivity and ‘equality’. 
Demographic representivity only boosts representation of ‘designated groups’ in the workforce. 
The failings of the concept of demographic representivity are that it is irrational and arbitrary as 
shown by the unrealistic figures (also known as the ‘numbers game’) that were at play in Naidoo 
v Minister of Safety and Security.  In this matter93 an Indian female police officer was denied a 
                                                          
89 Note 68 above, para 44. 
90 Minister of Finance and another v Van Heerden (note 18 above) para 44. 
91 Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 52. 
92 Louw (note 36 above) 409, 419. 
93 Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2013 (3) SA 486 (LC) para 6. 
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promotion on the basis that there were no vacancies available for Indians because of the group’s 
low percentage of 2.5% in the national population profile. Naidoo’s promotion was not approved 
by the national panel despite having the second best score out of all the candidates who were 
interviewed for the promotion. The reasons cited by the national panel were that Naidoo’s 
appointment would not address representivity as well as the organisations service delivery 
standards.94 However, after resolving that Naidoo was unfairly discriminated by a quota driven 
employment equity plan (EEP), only informed by national demographics, the court ordered the 
SAPS to appoint her.95  
If a measure fails to pass the section 9(2) internal test, the dictates of the principle of rule of law 
requires an unfair discrimination enquiry in terms of the Harksen v Lane96 fairness test to be 
conducted. The following section discusses how demographic representivity can lead to unfair 
discrimination. 
2.4  Factors for determining instances of unfair discrimination 
Unfair discrimination is described as differentiating between people based on illegitimate 
grounds that are listed in section 9(3) of the Constitution.97 The prohibition against unfair 
discrimination also applies to grounds that are analogous to those listed in section 9(3).98 Any 
applicant who claims to have been unfairly disadvantaged based on an analogous ground should 
prove that the use of such attributes and characteristics not listed in section 9(3) of the 
Constitution unfairly impacts on their dignity as human beings.The determination whether a 
complainant has been unfairly discriminated depends on factors that were formulated in 
Harksen99 which are as follows: 
 the position of the complainants in society and whether they have suffered in the past from 
patterns of disadvantage, whether the discrimination in the case under consideration is on a 
specified ground or not;  
 the nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it;  
                                                          
94 Ibid para 6. 
95 Ibid para 232. 
96 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 51. 
97 Currie & De Waal (note 57 above) 222. 
98 Ibid 236. 
99 Note 96 above. 
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 the extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights or interests of complainants and 
whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental human dignity or constitutes an 
impairment of a comparably serious nature. 
 
These are discussed below in interrogating whether the concept of demographic representivity in 
terms of both the EEA and the EEAA unfairly impacts on people from non-designated groups as 
well as other minority groups that are often excluded from affirmative action benefits. 
2.4.1  The position of the complainants 
The position of the complainant in society is one of the influential factors in determining whether 
a measure has an unfair impact on the victim.100 The criterion used to determine affirmative 
action beneficiaries in the Constitution is past disadvantage caused by unfair discrimination.101 
This criterion in section 9(2) of the Constitution has been abandoned in both the EEA and the 
EEAA which use race, sex and disability as their only criterion to determine beneficiaries of 
affirmative action. Naidoo is one such decision in which people from minority groups were 
denied promotions based on demographic representivity, a ground which is analogous to grounds 
of sex and race which are prohibited in section 9(3) of the Constitution. The concept of 
demographic representivity which is a mechanism empowered by both the EEA and the EEAA 
makes use of  degrees of disadvantage which often results in African people, who are a majority 
in the national population profile always benefiting the most. 
Minority groups have been disadvantaged and continue to be disadvantaged under both the EEA 
and the EEAA. In the context of Solidarity obo Barnard,102 Barnard in her personal capacity and 
as a public servant belongs to a class of people who have been deeply affected by the past and 
present inequalities, namely, women.103 Just as there is a need to eradicate racial discrimination, 
there is also a need to remedy gender disadvantages. Gender assumptions were recognised by the 
CC in President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo.104 The failure to declare 
Ms Barnard’s exclusion as unfair discrimination based on race and gender shows the CC’s 
changing views influenced by race.  
                                                          
100 Ibid. 
101 See section 9(2) of the Constitution. 
102 Note 82 above. 
103 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard (note 83 above) para 171. 
104 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) para 109. 
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2.4.2  The nature of the provision and the purpose sought to be achieved 
The concept of demographic representivity realises the principle of social inclusion which is 
envisioned in the Constitution.105 The concept seeks to redress the disproportionate 
representation of various race groups in the South African labour market.106 However, the 
concept of demographic representivity in both the EEA and the EEAA is deeply rooted in the 
idea of ‘equitable representation’, a term which is alien to section 9 of the Constitution. The 
requirement for demographic representivity as proof of ‘equality’ is not referred to in the 
Constitution, other than in section 174 of the Constitution which requires broad representivity 
when appointing judges.107 Section 9(1) of the Constitution provides for ‘equality’ of 
opportunities108 while the concept of demographic representivity seeks ‘equality’ of outcomes, 
resulting in punitive and retaliatory measures. 
As distinct from Hugo,109 where the discriminatory conduct was held to serve a legitimate 
governmental purpose, the concept of demographic representivity fails to do so.  By requiring 
that all designated employers make use of the national and the regionally economically active 
population profiles in determining employment quotas per each race group, new patterns of 
disadvantage are created for minority groups being Coloured, Indian and the physically able 
bodied White people.110 Thus, the concept of demographic representivity in terms of both the 
EEA and the EEAA unjustifiably creates degrees of disadvantage that tend to prefer Africans to 
the exclusion of other racial groups designated as legitimate beneficiaries of affirmative action.  
2.4.3  The extent to which rights or interest of the complainants have been impaired 
In S v Makwanyane,111 the right to human dignity was held to be one of the fundamental factors 
for consideration in determining whether any conduct is denigrating. Human dignity is one of the 
founding values in the Constitution that guide the interpretation of affirmative action 
measures.112 Moreover, human dignity is an aspect of the general notion of ‘equality’ which 
                                                          
105 See the Preamble of the Constitution. 
106 Malan (note 10 above) 427. 
107 See section 174(2) of the Constitution. 
108 Solidarity obo Barnard v South African Police Service 2014 (2) SA 1 (SCA) para 58. 
109 Note 104 above, para 115. 
110 Malan (note 10 above) 428. 
111 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 94, 135. 
112 Note 50 above. 
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recognises that all people are equal in dignity, and to that effect that it is unfair discrimination to 
impugn on a person’s dignity. Demographic representivity breaches the right to human dignity. 
In Solidarity obo Barnard,113 race was used by the National Commissioner as a determinant 
factor, thereby outweighing Barnard’s gender, experience, and attitude, and to that effect, her 
value as a person was seriously undermined. The right to ‘equality’ and dignity are independent 
rights that complement each other and sometimes the affirmative action aspect of ‘equality’ 
comes into conflict with the right to human dignity.114  
The founding values of the Constitution, namely, human dignity, ‘equality’, non-racialism, and 
non-sexism,115 do not permit the exclusion of those disfavoured by section 9(2) of the 
Constitution. Moreover, the CC’s jurisprudence should be influenced by Immanuel Kant’s 
philosophical thinking on human dignity as it emphasises that “human worth is impaired when 
persons are treated, not as ends in themselves, but as mere objects.”116 Thus, people should not 
be treated as a means to an end but rather as ends themselves.117 This means that those 
disfavoured by section 9(2) of the Constitution should not be denigrated as a means of 
empowering the targeted groups. Dignity encompasses both individualistic and collective 
rights.118 Thus, the concept of demographic representivity is unconstitutional because it 
distinguishes between people who are inherently equal in dignity thereby impairing their self-
worth.119 
The shortcomings of Solidarity obo Barnard120are discussed below. 
2.5  The shortcomings of Solidarity obo Barnard (CC) 
The Solidarity obo Barnard121 decision displays the tension that is caused by the implementation 
of remedial measures in complying with the obligation of affirmative action. Barnard, a white 
female police officer, was denied a promotion on two occasions despite being the best 
                                                          
113 Note 82 above, para 177. 
114 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard (note 83 above) para 169. 
115 Note 50 above. 
116 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 26. 
117 S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) para 38. 
118 S Cowen "Can ‘Dignity' Guide South Africa's Equality Jurisprudence?" (2001) 17 SAJHR 34, 51. 
119 Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) para 31. 
120 Note 82 above. 
121 Ibid. 
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candidate.122 The reasons given by the National Commissioner were that her appointment would 
not advance representivity and that the post did not compromise service delivery.123 White 
females were overrepresented at salary level 9.124 The majority judgement of the CC, led by 
Moseneke ACJ, held that the South African Police Service (SAPS) employment equity plan 
(EEP) is a measure as contemplated in section 9(2) of the Constitution,125 refusing however to 
pronounce on whether the EEP amounted to the implementation of quotas or not. The CC based 
its decision on the fact that the National Commissioner was empowered by the National 
Instrument to exercise his discretion as long it was rational.126 Thus, the fact that the SAPS EEP 
did not bar Barnard from future professional advancement, the non-critical role of the post and 
the National Commissioner’s failure to even appoint African candidates in the absence of best 
suited candidates ameliorated his conduct as pursuing genuine employment equity goals.127   
The CC’s main judgement may have been wrong for several reasons. Firstly, the CC had a 
misconception that it was not empowered to pronounce on the legality of the SAPS EEP in the 
absence of an administrative law review claim. Barnard alleged unfair discrimination, which is a 
different claim from an administrative law review.128 The EEA prohibits unfair discrimination in 
terms of section 6(1), and Barnard claimed that the National Commissioner’s decision, which 
was informed by the SAPS EEP, violated this prohibition.129 Section 6(2) of the EEA provides 
an affirmative action defence.130 However, the SAPS can only be exonerated from an unfair 
discrimination claim if the National Commissioner’s decision is compliant with the aim of the 
EEA. The EEA expressly prohibits quota driven affirmative action measures.131 Thus, the CC 
was supposed to interpret the purpose of the EEA and thereafter establish whether the National 
Commissioner’s conduct complied with the Act.132 The CC’s refusal to pronounce on the legality 
                                                          
122 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 (note 83 above) para 201. 
123 Ibid para 16. 
124 Ibid para 66. 
125 Ibid para 70. 
126 Ibid para 66. 
127 Ibid para 65, 70. 
128 Ibid para 84. 
129 Ibid para 86. 
130 Section 6(2)(a) of the EEA provides that “It is not unfair discrimination to take affirmative action measures 
consistent with the purpose of this Act.” 
131 Note 86 above. 
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of the SAPS EEP was a miscarriage of law. This is despite an earlier pronouncement by the court 
in Cusa v Tao Ying Metal Industries and Others133 that: 
“Where a point of law is apparent on the papers, but the common approach of the parties proceeds 
on a wrong perception of what the law is, a court is not only entitled, but is in fact also obliged, 
mero motu, to raise the point of law and require the parties to deal therewith. Otherwise, the result 
would be a decision premised on an incorrect application of the law. That would infringe the 
principle of legality [emphasis added].” 
 
The CC’s failure to uphold its earlier decision in Cusa shows the court’s inconsistency in its 
application of law. As stated in Cusa,134  the point of law was that Barnard had not asserted her 
right to fairness on the basis that the SAPS EEP unfairly impacted on her. She had only claimed 
unfairness on the part of the National Commissioner’s decision not to appoint her. To quote from 
The Bill of Rights Handbook,135 Currie and De Waal states the standard set under the rule of law, 
that rationality is not triggered only by differentiation, and this means that the complainant does 
not need to raise a claim that legislation or a measure differentiates between people to trigger the 
test of such legislation or measure. The exercise of public power is required to be rational, thus, 
the CC was supposed to answer the question whether the SAPS EEP amounted to the 
implementation of quotas regardless of Barnard’s plea. It is difficult to understand how the CC 
adjudicated the Barnard case without evaluating the SAPS EEP against the requirements of the 
EEA, considering that the National Commissioner’s decision was informed by the SAPS EEP. 
Secondly, the CC erred when it pronounced that the SAPS EEP did not constitute an absolute bar 
to the professional advancement of Barnard. Section 15(4) of the EEA136 shows that the role of 
the EEA is not only to advance affirmative action, but also to allow individuals from non-
designated groups who are prevented from advancing by affirmative action to challenge 
affirmative action measures that impose absolute barriers. Barnard alleged that the National 
Commissioner created an absolute barrier for her professional advancement based on the fact 
that she is a white person, conduct that section 15(4) of the EEA prohibits.137 In refuting 
Barnard’s allegation, the CC reasoned that she had since been promoted to a higher rank than she 
                                                          
133 2009 (2) SA 204 (CC) para 68.   
134 Ibid.   
135 Currie & De Waal (note 57 above) 222. 
136 Section 15(4) of the EEA provides that, “Subject to section 42, nothing in this section requires a designated 
employer to take any decision concerning an employment policy or practice that would establish an absolute barrier 
to the prospective or continued employment or advancement of people who are not from ‘designated groups’.” 
137 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard (note 83 above) para 90. 
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was before.138 However, the CC’s conclusion was unreasonable because the court chose to 
ignore an absolute barrier that had been imposed on Barnard with respect of the promotion to 
salary level 9 and the court justified this anomaly by referring to a promotion that came at a later 
stage. 
Thirdly, the CC erred by commenting on the National Commissioner’s claim that the non-
appointment of Barnard did not compromise SAPS’s provision of service delivery. By virtue of 
the fact that the post existed within the ranks of the SAPS its functions needed to be 
performed.139 Moreover, the post was advertised on three occasions and this serves to show that 
the post might have been important for SAPS provision of service delivery.140 The CC’s 
conclusion that the National Commissioner’s decision not to appoint Barnard did not hamper the 
provision of service delivery encroached on the separation of powers.141 The CC commented on 
a matter of policy, this amounts to overseeing the executive and that is in breach of the 
separation of powers. Thus, the CC’s main decision in its entirety is tainted by this illegality. 
Lastly, the CC’s failure to recognise Barnard as a member of a designated group was wrong. The 
CC chose to restrict the requirements for representivity to only the race imperative. Being a 
woman, Barnard is a legitimate beneficiary of affirmative action.142 The CC chose to be silent on 
this point. The decision was in direct conflict with section 9(2) of the Constitution that requires 
the advancement of historically disadvantaged people as a whole. The CC adopted the notion of 
the degree of disadvantage that was used in Motala v University of KwaZulu-Natal and 
Another,143 which was wrong. The SAPS National Commissioner should have considered the 
gender imperative and then tried to balance it with the need to achieve race representivity.144 The 
Harksen fairness test requires proportionality to always inform decisions that may unfairly 
impact on people. Proportionality requires the balancing of factors if one factor is to supersede 
the other. The CC advanced a defence for the National Commissioner’s failure to consider 
gender stating that Barnard never raised the gender argument.145 The fact that the CC chose not 
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to raise this point of law that was lacking in Barnard’s argument, applying the court’s earlier 
decision in Cusa,146 points to the CC’s decision being reached on a wrong point of law 
consequently being affected by this illegality. 
Thus, for the reasons mentioned above, the failure of SAPS to appoint Barnard was irrational and 
unfair and supports the claim that the EEP has a quota driven motive for representivity, which 
conflicts with the EEA’s aim.147 Moseneke ACJ’s decision appears to have been swayed by his 
desire to defend the weaknesses of the rationality test he established in his earlier judgement in 
Van Heerden.148 The Van Heerden rationality test mainly relies on its first two legs of enquiry 
and abandons the third leg which requires a fairness test consequently resulting in a low 
threshold for any legislation or a measure to pass muster under section 9(2) of the Constitution. 
The CC made a very wrong precedent by relying on the Van Heerden rationality test to 
adjudicate the Solidarity obo Barnard149 decision.  
 2.6  Conclusion 
The Van Heerden test sets a very low threshold for measures to meet the requirement of 
legitimate affirmative action measures in terms of section 9(2) of the Constitution. The Van 
Heerden test sets a very risky standard that has the effect of endorsing measures that otherwise 
impact on the inherent dignity of people as legitimate affirmative action measures. The 
rationality test set in Van Heerden emphasises more on the first two legs of enquiry however 
without incorporating a fairness test as is the case in the Harksen fairness test. Thus, in the 
interest of safeguarding people against irrational and arbitrary affirmative action measures, the 
Harksen fairness test is the most appropriate approach to utilise in determining the legality of 
affirmative action measures. The Harksen fairness test offers a strict standard which prevents 
measures that meet the Van Heerden rationality test but otherwise impugn on human dignity 
from being endorsed as legitimate affirmative action measures. As displayed above, the concept 
of demographic representivity in terms of both the EEA and the EEAA is an illegitimate 
affirmative action measure that fails the Harksen fairness test because it has an unfair impact on 
minority groups.  
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CHAPTER 3: PROVISIONS FOR REPRESENTIVITY IN THE CONSTITUTION 
 
3.1  Introduction 
The concept of demographic representivity has been critiqued with regard to its breach of the 
right to ‘equality’.150 Section 9(2) of the Constitution allows for affirmative action measures and 
sets a standard to which they should conform however, without providing a procedure of how 
those measures should be achieved. The duty is placed on the courts to interpret the required 
procedure that is envisaged by section 9(2) of the Constitution as displayed in Solidarity obo 
Barnard.151 Because the interpretation of the Constitution is not limited to section 9, it is 
necessary to consider other sections that mention requirements akin to demographic 
representivity and which may also provide guidance. The extent to which representivity is 
provided for in these sections may even guide instances of employment in the private sector.152 
The sections include section 174(2), section 193(2), 195(1)(i) and section 205(2) of the 
Constitution. Each section is discussed in turn below. 
3.2  Section 174(2) of the Constitution 
Section 174(2) of the Constitution mentions requirements for appointment to the judiciary that 
are akin to demographic representivity.153 The insertion of the section in chapter VIII of the 
Constitution might have been a deliberate attempt to provide a procedure for affirmative action 
measures which section 9(2) of the Constitution lacks.154 Section 174 of the Constitution reads as 
follows:  
 
(1) Any person to be appointed to the Constitutional Court must also be a South African citizen. 
(2) The need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa 
must be considered when judicial officers are appointed. Any appropriately qualified woman or 
man who is a fit and proper person may be appointed as a judicial officer. 
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The section advocates for a legitimate and a broadly representative judiciary.155 Section 9(2) of 
the Constitution complements this requirement by placing a duty on the Judicial Service 
Commission to take active measures to remedy the disparities in the demographic composition of 
the bench created by apartheid.156 The requirement to consider race and gender compositions in 
terms of section 174(2) is justified bearing in mind South Africa’s history of race and gender 
based exclusions, dispossessions, and unequal opportunities.157 The race and gender composition 
requirement merely refers to the need for all races to be represented in the Judiciary. Given the 
general principle of ‘equality’, taking race and gender into account must be seen as exceptional, 
and only for the limited purposes provided in section 9 of the Constitution, unless the 
Constitution makes special provision elsewhere, as the case for section 174(2) of the 
Constitution.  
Transformation requires judicial appointments to incorporate diversity.158 A diverse judiciary 
gains legitimacy and credibility from all segments of the society as it seeks to serve South Africa 
as a whole.159 Transformation is compelled by the past marginalisation of the majority of black 
South African people and their exclusion from consideration for judicial appointments.160 
Mokgoro J, a former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, voiced her concerns 
about the judiciary having been white-and-male dominated in the pre-democratic era. She asserts 
this led to the disenfranchisement of the majority of black South African people.161 As a result, 
the Judicial Service Commission noted a preponderance of male applicants as opposed to female 
applicants.162  
The method employed for achieving broad representivity in the judiciary is scrutinised below. 
This is done to establish the difference between the concept of demographic representivity and 
broad representivity that is provided for in terms of section 174 of the Constitution. 
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3.2.1  Numerical goals or quotas in section 174 of the Constitution? 
An enquiry as to whether judicial transformation requires absolute race representivity163 is 
necessary. Section 174(2) of the Constitution cannot be read without subsection (1) if a sensible 
interpretation of representivity is to be derived from it.164 Subsection (1) reads:  
(1) Any appropriately qualified woman or man who is a fit and proper person may be appointed as a 
judicial officer. Any person to be appointed to the Constitutional Court must also be a South 
African citizen. 
(2) The need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa 
must be considered when judicial officers are appointed. 
 
Section 174(2) of the Constitution utilises race and gender considerations as diversity indicators 
and does not seek to make them determinant factors for appointment.165 Thus, the need for 
judicial appointments to reflect the society’s social composition coordinates with the need for an 
appropriately qualified and competent Judiciary.166 Section 174(2) places an obligation on the 
Judicial Service Commission to enquire into the race and gender composition of the Judiciary 
before effecting appointments.167 When underrepresentation is detected, the disparities are 
remedied by appointing competent and appropriately qualified candidates from the affected race 
or gender groups.168 Nevertheless, compliance with the requirement of a competent Judiciary 
safeguards the transformation from degenerating into the implementation of quotas solely based 
on race and gender preferences. 
Thus, in Singh v The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others,169 the 
Ministry of Justice in keeping up with the requirements of competence ordered the Magistrates 
Commission to consider seriously the provisions of section 174 of the Constitution in relation to 
section 9 of the Constitution. The Magistrates’ Commission had discriminatorily excluded a 
disabled Indian female from a number of posts on the basis of inflexible ‘race and gender 
preferences’ or quotas.170 The selection criterion was held to discriminate unfairly because it 
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overlooked considerations of merit in favour of race and gender preferences.171 Although, 
according to section 174(2) of the Constitution race and gender considerations are important, 
treating them as the sole selection criteria for the achievement of broad representivity leads to the 
subordination of the seventeen prohibited grounds of unfair discrimination in section 9(3) of the 
Constitution.172 
3.3  Section 195(1)(i) of the Constitution 
Section 195(1)(i) of the Constitution provides that public administration must reflect broadly the 
diverse composition of the South African people. The section provides that: 
“Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with 
employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the 
need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation [emphasis added].”173 
 
The phrase “must be” in the section is authoritative and may create the impression that a strict 
quota is provided for in public administration appointments. However, the phrase “must be 
broadly representative of the South African people,” means no more than that the South African 
people should feel socially included in the management of the public administration, without any 
reference being given to demographic statistics. The peremptory wording of section 195(1)(i) 
makes it more authoritative than the provisions of section 174(2) of the Constitution, which 
provides a less demanding criterion.174 Section 195(1)(i) of the Constitution applies to all local, 
provincial or national government departments and enterprises while section 174(2) only 
provides for judicial appointments.175 Section 195(1)(i) of the Constitution was mentioned in 
Munsamy v Minister of Safety and Security176 as an important section that requires compulsory 
attainment of broad representivity in public administration appointments. Thus, the staff 
composition of public administration must be broadly representative of South Africa’s social 
composition.177 Broad representivity must not be confused with the concept of demographic 
representivity which provide for a strict quota based on demographics. Section 195(1)(i) is based 
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on an assumption that it provides a standard that should apply to affirmative action measures 
envisioned in section 9(2) of the Constitution, which is the pursuance of ‘equality’ of 
opportunities. 
The achievement of broad representivity required in public administration appointments must be 
achieved with consideration of other competing factors.178 Section 195(1)(i) of the Constitution 
provides a pool of factors for consideration. The mechanism allows for a balance between all the 
competing factors. The other factors that should be considered along with the requirement to 
achieve broad representivity include ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress 
disparities caused by apartheid. These are discussed in detail below. 
3.3.1  Ability 
Ability is a broad term, which is capable of referring to many qualities. However, in this 
instance, ability refers to competency.179 In the interest of enhancing service delivery, ability is 
one of the factors to be considered when hiring prospective employees or promoting current 
employees in public administration. Race and gender attributes can only be determinants for 
appointment of candidates who possess the required degree of competence.180 Belonging to a 
designated group does not enhance employment prospects for incompetent and unskilled job 
aspirants.181 In Solidarity obo Barnard182 the decision of the SAPS National Commissioner could 
be justified on grounds of ability for withdrawing a vacancy after failing to find appropriately 
qualified candidates from designated employees. However, the SAPS National Commissioner 
can be condemned for failure to appoint Barnard, a member of a non-designated group who was 
a suitably qualified candidate, based on representivity, disregarding the importance of merit in 
employment.183 The consideration of ability makes it possible for the public administration to 
reflect a diverse South African workforce, which is competent to boost service delivery. This 
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consideration strikes a balance between the need to achieve broad representivity and the need for 
a competent workforce.184  
3.3.2  Objectivity 
Objectivity requires appointments to be allocated realistically in response to the current needs of 
the department involved.185 The requirement of objectivity safeguards public administration 
appointments from tokenism. Appointments in the public administration should not just be by 
numbers, but should be directed at supporting the continued viability of the department 
concerned.186 Appointing employees along demographic profiles might result in the employment 
of less qualified candidates if not carefully dealt with.187 Objectivity requires a situation sensitive 
approach in achieving employment equity. However, the SAPS’s objectivity in its recent 
deployments is questionable. The SAPS recently embarked on deploying Xhosa speaking police 
officers to Khayelitsha, Cape Town where the local population is approximately estimated to be 
90% Xhosa speaking.188 The deployment was in accordance with an objective to make 
communication between the local people and the police officers easy. While, public 
administration is beneficial if personnel that the community can easily relate to carry it out,189 
SAPS’s decision unfairly discriminates against police officers from other race groups who also 
have an equal entitlement to be stationed at Khayelitsha. 
3.3.3  Fairness 
What is fair depends on the circumstances of a particular situation. Fairness entails the 
consideration of all competing interests in decision-making, including considering the severity of 
any decision on the rights and legitimate interests of job seekers and promotion aspirants 
excluded from the benefits.190 Fairness requires rationality and proportionality in the selection 
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criteria to curb against appointments that are unreasonable191 and arbitrary. The achievement of 
broad representivity in public administration should be done in a fair manner and should be 
consistent in application. 
Rationality requires reasonableness in public administration appointments. The achievement of 
broad representivity has to be rationally connected to the need to maintain a competent 
workforce.192 There has to be a rational connection between the choice of a particular individual 
for appointment and their role in enhancing service delivery.193 A consistent consideration of 
factors listed in section 195(1)(i) of the Constitution exonerates public administration 
departments from unfair discrimination claims. Unreasonable reliance on race as a criterion for 
appointment amounts to unfair discrimination.194 Solidarity obo Barnard195 confirmed that 
previously disadvantaged people could only be accommodated on condition that they have the 
required degree of competence. Public administration departments have to apply their 
employment equity plans rationally and in compliance with both the EEA196 and the EEAA. 
Proportionality requires the balancing of competing factors.197 This means that public 
administration departments have to weigh the affirmative action obligation against 
considerations of ability, objectivity, and fairness. Proportionality requires broad representivity 
to be achieved without disproportionately affecting the rights of other work seekers and the 
provision of service delivery.198 The need to create a diverse workforce must consistently relate 
to the need for a skilled workforce that enhances service delivery.199 Affirmative action measures 
that exclusively favour ‘designated groups’ to the detriment of other employees and job seekers 
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would be contrary to the objects of the EEA.200 There has to be a rational means of achieving 
broad representivity without necessarily imposing a strict quota.201 
3.3.4  The need to redress imbalances of the past 
The need to redress injustices of the past requires public administration departments to ensure the 
‘equitable representation’ of people previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.202 
Apartheid caused disparities in employment, with the majority of black South African job 
aspirants’ employment prospects in the labour market being limited. Section 195(1)(i) of the 
Constitution seeks to compensate the majority of the disenfranchised black people by 
empowering the able but disadvantaged job aspirants. However, the affirmative action obligation 
placed by section 195(1)(i) of the Constitution must be fulfilled with consideration of the 
abovementioned factors. While it is important to remedy disparities of the past, less restrictive 
means should be used to achieve that objective.203 Affirmative action measures should not be 
used to disadvantage unfairly other members from ‘designated groups’ as well as members of 
non-designated groups.  
3.4  Section 193(2) of the Constitution 
Section 193(2) provides that the institutions established by Chapter IX of the Constitution must 
reflect the societal composition of the South African people.204 Section 193 of the Constitution 
reads as follows: 
(1) Public Protector and the members of any Commission established by this Chapter must be women 
or men who- 
a) are South African citizens; 
b) are fit and proper persons to hold the particular office; and 
c) comply with any other requirements prescribed by national legislation. 
(2) The need for a Commission established by this Chapter to reflect broadly the race and gender 
composition of South Africa must be considered when members are appointed. 
 
The section requires that the composition of Commissioners reflect South Africa’s rich human 
diversity. The requirement, however, does not place a strict reliance on demographics as a 
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determinant factor for appointment. Section 193(2) is worded the same way as section 174(2) of 
the Constitution.205 The phrase “must be considered” makes section 193(2) of the Constitution 
less demanding than section 195(1)(i) of the Constitution, which provides for mandatory broad 
representivity.206 Broad representivity only requires inclusion of all segments of the South 
African society in the Commissions as opposed to the concept of demographic representivity 
which requires a mathematical calculation of employment quotas based on demographics. 
Section 193(2) requires broad representivity to be achieved in consideration with other 
competing factors.207  
The requirement of broad representivity should be complemented by the job aspirant’s degree of 
competence and possession of appropriate qualifications and skills.208 Employment based on 
merit is the standard that is required to achieve broad representivity in institutions that support 
constitutional democracy. Merit is a requirement while broad representivity is a consideration to 
be taken into account. Observance of obligations imposed by national legislation is also required 
in achieving broad representivity in these institutions.209 
3.5  Section 205(2) of the Constitution 
Section 205(2) of the Constitution requires the Police Service to consider the needs of provinces. 
The section reads: 
“National legislation must establish the powers and functions of the police service and must 
enable the police service to discharge its responsibilities effectively, taking into account the 
requirements of the provinces [emphasis added].”210 
 
Section 205(2) accords with the requirement to consider regional demographics in the EEA.211 
Section 42 of the EEA provides that the regional economically active population profile must 
also be considered when setting numerical targets. Section 205(2) affirms the need to consider 
regional demographics in order for the Police Service to discharge its services effectively. The 
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latter section was mentioned in Solidarity obo Barnard212 as an essential section that was 
supposed to be considered by SAPS when it decided whether to promote Barnard or not. The 
section recognises the practical differences in the needs of the national and provincial spheres.  
To disregard the needs of the provinces not only affects the legitimacy of the Police Service, but 
also its efficiency. As the court observed in Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & Others, 213 the 
SAPS can hardly discharge its responsibilities efficiently if its staff does not reflect the society it 
serves. Inclusion of the community builds trust and cooperation with the Police Service for better 
efficiency. The efficiency approach has been used to justify the appointment of a suitably 
qualified African male over a suitably qualified white female.214 The approach sacrifices 
‘equality’ by invoking efficiency as a defence thereby impacting on those excluded.215 The use 
of this unacceptable practice has been displayed by Solidarity obo Barnard,216  where the SAPS 
National Commissioner decided not to fill a vacancy with a candidate from a non-designated 
group because representivity would not be advanced. 
3.6  Can the above-mentioned provisions be read to create an exception to section 
9(2) of the Constitution?  
The special representivity requirements spelt out in sections 174(2), 193(2) and 195(1)(i) of the 
Constitution have been placed in the Constitution to provide specifically for the appointment of 
judicial officers , members of Commissions which support democracy, and all government 
departments and enterprises respectively.217 The rules of interpretation would suggest that these 
provisions create exceptions from section 9(2), which should be read restrictively to 
accommodate instances which require the achievement of broad representivity, that is social 
inclusiveness per se, not the concept of demographic representivity. This is because section 9(2) 
runs against the general principle of ‘equality’.218 
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Sections 174(2), 193(2) and 195(1)(i) of the Constitution may serve as a guide for the practice to 
be followed whenever demographic representivity provisions are encountered in legislation, 
Broad representivity only requires social inclusiveness without making use of the strict 
mathematical reliance on population profiles, as encountered with demographic representivity. 
Although the two concepts are not the same, the requirement of broad representivity is 
favourable because it places merit first while race and gender considerations follow. Because of 
this, the concept of broad representivity is best suited to boost competence in the workforce, as 
opposed to demographic representivity which directly relies on race and gender consideration as 
the sole criterion for appointment.  
The inclusion of sections 174(2), 193(2) and 195(1)(i) of the Constitution as exceptions in terms 
of section 9(2) of the Constitution excludes them from the general notion of ‘equality’ in section 
9 of the Constitution. Thus, the concept of demographic representivity is unconstitutional 
because the abovementioned provisions are the only instances in which limited versions of 
demographic representivity are permitted to exist constitutionally. 
3.7  Conclusion 
The consideration of broad representivity has been established to mean only social inclusiveness 
and this maintains the merit principle because there is no rigid application of population 
percentages. More importantly, the existence of sections 174(2), 193(2) and 195(1)(i) in the 
Constitution, as special exceptions to the section 9(2) affirmative action provision, seems to 
suggest that the concept of demographic representivity cannot be used in conformity with section 
9 of the Constitution as a whole.219 If the drafters of the Constitution contemplated the future use 
of the concept of demographic representivity, they could have included a provision which 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 55 OF 1998 
 
4.1  Introduction 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 3, the issue of representivity is also featured in the Constitution. 
Thus, the EEA, being a creature of the Constitution, must give effect to the constitutional 
obligation to achieve ‘equality’. The aim of the EEA is to ensure the ‘equitable representation’ of 
‘designated groups’,220 and to deal with the disparities in employment caused by the apartheid 
regime, which perpetuated preference of white people in respect of employment opportunities. 
Section 2 of the EEA states that the aim of the Act is to achieve employment equity by: 
a) promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair 
discrimination; and  
b) implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in employment 
experienced by ‘designated groups’, in order to ensure their ‘equitable representation’ in all 
occupational categories and levels in the workforce. 
 
Chapter III of the EEA permits the preferential treatment of members from ‘designated 
groups’.221 To achieve the objective stated above, the EEA makes use of the concept of 
demographic representivity,222 as a mechanism for transforming the labour market to reflect the 
South African social composition.223 The EEA also includes a provision that expressly prohibits 
the use of racial quotas in the South African labour market.224 The insertion of this provision in 
the EEA is intended to prevent representivity from being manipulated into implementation of 
racial quotas.225 Malan defines representivity as follows:  
“Representivity is the norm in terms of which institutions and organised spheres of people are 
required to be composed in such a manner that they reflect the national population profile, 
particularly the racial profile of the national population.”226 
 
In this way representivity and the concept of demographic representivity mean the same thing. 
The following chapter analyses the legal and practical effects of the EEA’s provisions for 
representivity as they were prior to the amendments introduced by the EEAA 47 of 2013 and 
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also the jurisprudence pertaining to these provisions. The provisions for representivity are 
discussed in 4.2 below. 
4.2  The EEA provisions for representivity 
Representivity has been generally held as an important principle on which the South African 
social order depends.227 As was demonstrated in Chapter 3, representivity also features in the 
Constitution.228 However, the real effects of representivity as a tool for transformation can be 
seen from the EEA provisions.229 The relevant sections in the EEA that provide for 
representivity, namely, sections 2, 15 and 42 are discussed in turn below. 
4.2.1  Section 2 of the EEA 
The EEA’s purpose is to achieve employment equity in the labour market by: 
a) promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair 
discrimination; and  
b) implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in employment 
experienced by ‘designated groups’, in order to ensure their ‘equitable representation’ in all 
occupational categories and all levels in the work force”230 
‘Equitable representation’ in terms of the EEA is one and the same thing as the concept of 
demographic representivity.231 What this means is that the workforce of each designated 
employer has to reflect the national population profile of the country in its racial diversity. 232 
Section 2 being the aim of the EEA declares from the onset that its affirmative action measures 
are solely based on the concept of demographics representivity which uses race and sex as its 
main pointers in determining beneficiaries. 
Section 2 of the EEA brings in ‘equitable representation’, a term which is not provided for in 
section 9(2) of the Constitution. The standard that is required by the general notion of ‘equality’ 
is that people be afforded equal opportunities.233 ‘Equitable representation’ is a term which is 
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alien to the Constitution as a whole. There is no mention of such a term in the Constitution and 
its inclusion in the EEA deviates from the known criteria for one to qualify as an affirmative 
action beneficiary.234 The Constitutional requirement for a person to benefit under section 9(2) 
affirmative action clause is that such person has suffered from past unfair discrimination. 
‘Equitable representation’ in terms of section 2 of the EEA places race and gender as its major 
factors for determining who should benefit under affirmative action measures and this has the 
potential of leading to the unfair differentiation of people in terms of section 9(3) of the 
Constitution. ‘Equitable representation’ is contrary to the principles of ‘equality’ and human 
dignity.235  
4.2.2  Section 15 of the EEA 
Section 15(1) of the EEA reads as follows: 
“Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from 
‘designated groups’ have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all 
occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a designated employer.” 
Section 15(1) of the EEA defines what an affirmative action measure should comprise. 
Affirmative action measures are measures designed to advance and promote appropriately 
qualified people from historically disadvantaged groups in order to increase their representation 
in all units and levels of employment.236 As discussed in 4.2.1, ‘equitable representation’ 
requires the workforce of a designated employer to mirror the national demographics of the 
population. This idea of ‘equitable representation’ thus goes beyond what section 9(2) of the 
Constitution permits and inevitably results in quotas.237  Quota driven remedial measures also 
disregards merit. 
Section 15(2)(d) of the EEA provides that:  
“Affirmative action measures implemented by a designated employer must include …subject to 
subsection (3), measures to ensure the ‘equitable representation’ of suitably qualified people 
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from ‘designated groups’ in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce [emphasis 
added].”238 
The section supplements section 15(1) of the EEA by providing a way of advancing the concept 
of demographic representivity. The measures which section 15(2)(d) refers to are numerical 
goals which should be used to allocate employment quotas per each race group. These numerical 
goals are informed by demographic statistics, making it difficult to execute those measures 
without implementing quotas. Section 15(3) of the EEA provides that affirmative action 
measures “include preferential treatment and numerical goals, but exclude quotas.”239 Section 15 
of the EEA offers an imprecise safe-guard against quotas because the execution of numerical 
goals has little difference to the concept of demographic representivity. Numerical goals only use 
a flexible criterion but with similar repercussions. The difference between the impermissible 
quotas and the legitimate measure of numerical goals in the EEA is discussed in 4.3.1 below. 
Section 15(4) of the EEA provides the following: 
“Subject to section 42, nothing in this section requires a designated employer to take any decision 
concerning an employment policy or practice that would establish an absolute barrier to the 
prospective or continued employment or advancement of people who are not from ‘designated 
groups’.” 
Section 15(4) of the EEA is a prohibition which seeks to prohibit employers from adopting 
employment policies that creates absolute barriers for the advancement, promotion or 
employment of people from non-’designated groups’. Section 15(4) could have been a good 
section was it not for its lack of authority. The lack of an authoritative term in section 15(4) 
means that all the other sections that are authoritative override it - for example section 42 of the 
EEA which creates demographic representivity requirements to which section 15(4) must 
succumb to. Solidarity obo Barnard240  is one of the decisions in which the issue of absolute 
barriers was considered, with the CC ruling that Barnard’s exclusion did not create an absolute 
barrier to her appointment, regardless of the fact that she was not appointed to salary level 9 
based on representivity.  
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4.2.3  Section 42 of the EEA 
Section 42 of the EEA is an assessment indicator that must be used by the Director-General or 
any persons or juristic persons applying the Act241 for the purpose of determining whether a 
designated employer is complying with the EEA’s employment equity obligations. Moreover, in 
addition to factors mentioned in section 15 of the EEA, section 42 requires the extent to which 
members from ‘designated groups’ are equitably represented in every unit and level of 
employment to be determined in relation to the 
“demographic profile of the national and regional economically active population; pool of 
suitably qualified people from ‘designated groups’ from which the employer may reasonably be 
expected to promote or appoint employees; economic and financial factors relevant to the sector 
in which the employer operates; present and anticipated economic and financial circumstances of 
the employer; and  the number of present and planned vacancies that exist in the various 
categories and levels, and the employer's labour turnover [emphasis added].”242 
Section 42 of the EEA implies that the prohibition against quotas is applicable to its factors 
because it states that those factors mentioned in section 15 of the EEA may also be considered in 
the assessment of compliance process. This means that the assessment factors listed in section 42 
of the EEA should be compliant with section 15(4), which prohibits designated employers from 
adopting employment policies or practices that create absolute barriers for hiring, promotion, and 
professional advancement of members from non-’designated groups’. However, as stated above, 
section 15(4) of the EEA lacks peremptory wording to make it authoritative. Only if a designated 
employer identifies underrepresentation of a designated group is it permissible to employ the 
section 42 factors to set numerical targets directed at remedying the deficiency in their 
representation.243 However, this type of demographic representivity would be one that is 
disguised in numerical goals. When a designated employer pursues goals that are informed by 
section 15 and 42 factors, such affirmative action measures would be legitimate for the purposes 
of section 15 of the EEA.244 A measure that does not take cognisance of or deviates from the 
standard set in section 15 and section 42 factors would operate the same way as quotas.245 
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Despite the clear standards of affirmative action measures that were displayed in the EEA’s 
abovementioned provisions for representivity, there are still problems with regard to the 
application of the Act, particularly with the provision of affirmative action benefits. The legal 
and practical effects caused by the implementation of race-based affirmative action in the South 
African labour market are discussed below. 
4.3  The legal and practical effects of the EEAs provisions for representivity 
 The application of the EEAs concept of demographic representivity often leads to unfair 
discrimination which the Act purports to combat. The implementation of quotas in the South 
African labour market exacerbates divisions in employment. The legal and practical effects 
posed by the implementation of demographic representivity in terms of the EEA are discussed 
below. 
4.3.1  Imposition of racial quotas 
A problem that is posed by the implementation of affirmative action measures in terms of section 
15 of the EEA is the potential implementation of racial quotas. Thus, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the legitimate measure of numerical goals and the prohibited quotas. The 
distinction of the terms serves to settle the confusion that surrounds the two terms. The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines quotas as “a number or percentage… of 
people, constituting a required or targeted minimum: e.g. a system of quotas for hiring minority 
applicants [emphasis added].”246 With regard to the implementation of quotas in the labour 
market, Pretorius, Klinck, and Ngwena describe quotas as follows: 
“Quotas refer to all preferential techniques that have the effect of reserving all or a fixed 
percentage of job opportunities for ‘designated groups’. This may be achieved through the setting 
aside of specific number of positions for ‘designated groups’ or by making designated group 
status the only or dominant criterion for eligibility for employment opportunities”247 
The observation by Pretorius, Klinck, and Ngwena shows that quotas are rigid by nature and do 
not allow any room for flexibility. The definition of quotas closely suits the aim and objective of 
the EEA. The EEAs aim is mainly the advancement of historically disadvantaged people and to 
                                                          
246 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 4 ed (2000). 
247 JL Pretorius, ME Klinck & CG Ngwena Employment Equity Law (loose-leaf, service issue 4, 2000) at ch 9-50. 
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that effect identifies those people as a designated group.248 Thus, being a black South African, 
whether African, Coloured, or Indian becomes the determinant factor for a person to qualify for 
affirmative action benefits.249 The merit of a job aspirant is overlooked in favour of race 
considerations, even though it might be relevant.250 This a rigid imposition of quotas.  
To give effect to the aim of the EEA, section 42 of the EEA requires regional and economically 
active population profiles to be taken into account in setting numerical goals for the advancement 
of ‘designated groups’.251 Thus, section 42 of the EEA reserves job opportunities that reflect the 
relative population percentages of designated and non-’designated groups’ and this mechanism 
operates the same way as quotas. However, the EEA’s wording implies that it advances a 
legitimate measure of numerical goals.252 A legitimate numerical goal is a target that is set based 
on demographic statistics but the only difference being that it is permitted by the EEA in section 
15(3). Thus, it is also crucial to scrutinise the meaning of numerical goals. 
The Code of Good Practice: Preparation, Implementation, and Monitoring of Employment 
Equity Plans253 promulgated by the Department of Labour, describes the basis of numerical goals 
as follows:  
“Numerical goals should be developed for the appointment and promotion of people from 
‘designated groups’. The purpose of these goals would be to increase the representation of people 
from ‘designated groups’ in each occupational category and level in the employer’s workforce, 
where underrepresentation has been identified and to make the workforce reflective of the 
relevant demographics as provided for in form EEA8.” 
The Department of Labour’s above-mentioned publication contrasts with Connolly’s observation 
that numerical goals “are aspirational in nature” and to that effect, that “they do not predetermine 
the outcome of any given selection decision.”254 The purpose of numerical goals that is described 
by the Code of Good Practice255 contains nothing different from the definition of quotas provided 
above. The target people of affirmative action measures are a pre-determined group, namely, the 
                                                          
248 Note 220 above. 
249 Louw (note 24 above) 339. 
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251 Section 42(a)(i) of the EEA. 
252 See section 15(3) to (4) of the EEA. 
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‘designated groups’.256 To achieve the EEA’s aim, numerical goals, just like quotas, utilise 
population percentages for the purposes of allocating affirmative action benefits to each target 
race group.257 For these reasons, no clear distinction can be drawn between the legitimate 
measure of numerical goals and the prohibited quotas, their only difference being that numerical 
goals are flexible and quotas are rigid in application, with similar results.258  
The pursuit of employment equity targets that withhold employment opportunities from 
members of non-’designated groups’ would be in breach of section 5 of the EEA which requires 
designated employers to take reasonable steps to ensure that their workforce is entitled to equal 
opportunities.259 The provisions of section 5 of the EEA requires people to be treated equally in 
respect of employment opportunities, is in line with section 9 that recognises that people are 
equal in dignity and should be treated equally. Thus, in as far as section 6(2) of the EEA provides 
a defence for preferring black South Africans, measures that are quota-driven or seek to 
perpetuate the disadvantage of non-’designated groups’ lack reasonableness and 
proportionality260 and fall short of being ‘legitimate’ affirmative action measures for the 
purposes of section 15(4) of the EEA.261 Section 6 of the EEA reads as follows: 
(1) It is not unfair discrimination to-  
a) take affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose of this Act; or  
b) distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent requirement of a job. 
 
Section 6(2) of the EEA contains a similar provision as section 9(2) of the Constitution. 
However, section 6(2) of the EEA provides a justification that goes beyond immutable 
characteristics and attributes, which are the affirmative action defence and the inherent 
requirements of the job defence. While an employer can use the affirmative action defence to 
refuse to advance non-’designated groups’, he is also empowered with the inherent requirement 
of the job defence in refusing to comply with rigid demographic statistics.   
                                                          
256 Note 221 above. 
257 Louw (note 24 above) 338. 
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259 Ibid 342. 
260 The requirement of reasonableness was established in Van Heerden rationality test in Minister of Finance and 
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4.3.2  Abrogation of the merit principle 
Merit is one of the foremost principles that maintain a workforce that is best suited to advance 
the business interests of designated employers. Merit is an important consideration that should 
not be easily overlooked.262 Merit denotes the skills, attributes, and characteristics that are used 
to determine whether a candidate would be in a position to perform a particular job 
satisfactorily.263 As indicated in 4.3.1 above, there is a possible lack of distinction between 
numerical goals and quotas; this section seeks to display how the imposition of quotas in the 
South African labour market affects merit-based employment.264 
The use of quotas is characterised by the use of non-job related factors in the employment 
selection criteria of designated employers.265 Race plays a major role in the implementation of 
quotas. While section 15 of the EEA provides two requirements for the implementation of 
affirmative action measures, namely, that the target group should be ‘designated groups’ and that 
such people should be appropriately qualified, designated employers often resort to non-job 
related factors when hiring and promoting employees.266 
Connolly observes that the imposition of quotas, which are often disguised as numerical goals, 
leads to the appointment of less qualified job candidates for the job.267 The concept of 
demographic representivity which the EEA utilises predetermines a fixed percentage of members 
who are to represent any particular race group.268 This implies that even if some people might be 
the best candidates for the job, they are excluded from consideration if the quota allocated to 
their group has been filled. This scenario is evident in Solidarity obo Barnard269 discussed in 
Chapter 2 (see 2.3 above). Barnard a white female police officer, after a series of two interviews, 
gave up due to the SAPS National Commissioner’s failure to appoint her despite being the best 
candidate for the promotion on all occasions. The National Commissioner cited representivity as 
one of the reasons for failure to promote Barnard. According to the SAPS EEP, it was apparent 
                                                          
262 Section 15(1) of the EEA provides that, affirmative action measures are measures that advance “suitably 
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that white females were overrepresented at salary level 9.270 As a result, the quota that had been 
allocated to white females had been filled and, even though Barnard was an appropriately 
qualified candidate, merit would not enhance her chances of being promoted, faced with a rigid 
quota placed by the SAPS EEP, which applied demographic representivity.271 The Barnard 
decision displays the impact of racial profiling on merit based employment. In accordance with 
the EEA’s obligation to achieve employment equity, demographic representivity uses racial 
profiling as a mechanism of achieving employment equity, which excludes other competing 
factors.272 It is for this reason that it was argued in 2.6 above that the concept of demographic 
representivity is unconstitutional. 
4.3.3  Exclusion of minority groups 
The use of demographic representivity has consequences for the South African labour market 
with regard to fairness. The EEA’s aim clearly states that the object of the Act is to achieve 
employment equity by advancing appropriately qualified people from ‘designated groups’.273 
Being a member of a designated group and being appropriately qualified are the only 
requirements for a person to qualify for affirmative action benefits under the EEA.274 The EEA 
aims to advance appropriately qualified people from ‘designated groups’ as a whole in order to 
ensure that they are equitably represented in every unit and level of employment.275 However, 
the wording of section of 42 of the EEA has not been carefully constructed by the legislature. 
Section 42 of the EEA establishes degrees of disadvantage that are not envisaged in the EEA’s 
aim.276 Section 42 of the EEA allows the extent to which employees are represented in the 
workplace to be considered even amongst ‘designated groups’.277 The aforementioned 
determination utilises the national and regional economically active population profiles as its 
mechanism of transformation. 
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Despite section 42 of the EEA being clear in its wording that both national and regional 
demographics are applicable in the setting of employment equity targets,278 some designated 
employers only resort to the use of the national economically active population profile in setting 
employment equity targets as was the case in Munsamy.279 This has the effect of excluding some 
of the targeted beneficiaries of the EEA. Thus, Africans, who constitute a majority of the 
national population profile, benefit the most. This, however, is problematic in that the EEA 
recognises ‘designated groups’ as a class of people who should be advanced as a whole.280 The 
demarcations created by demographic representivity when it distinguishes people based on their 
race displays the negative effects which the concept has as a mechanism of affirmative action in 
the South African labour market. In Munsamy v Minister of Safety and Security281 the court 
considered whether it is justifiable for an employer to favour one group of designated employees 
over another, which is purportedly overrepresented, in the absence of a clear EEP. Munsamy a 
police officer employed by SAPS was recommended for a post but was not appointed on the 
basis that Indians were overrepresented at that level and an African was appointed instead.282 
Indians were susceptible to past unfair discrimination and failure to promote Munsamy was 
considered to be unfair. The court found that the failure to appoint Munsamy amounted to unfair 
discrimination after considering the impact of the breach on his human dignity as a member of a 
designated group.283  
There are also problems that are caused by disregarding the regional economically active 
population profile when setting employment equity targets. Disregarding the regional 
economically active population profile affects minority groups who constitute a majority in some 
provinces in South Africa. The exclusion of regional demographics came under the spotlight in 
Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Others,284 which considered 
whether designated employers must consider both the regional and national economically active 
population profiles when setting employment equity targets. The applicants were Coloured 
people and one white person. The applicants alleged that the Department of Correctional Service 
                                                          
278 Note 242 above. 
279 Note 176 above, para 3. 
280 See (note 220 above). 
281 Note 176 above, para 3. 
282 Munsamy v Minister of Safety and Security (note 7 above) para 14. 
283 Ibid para 75. 
284 (2012) 11 BLLR 1163 (LC) para 4. 
Page | 46  
 
(DCS) unfairly discriminated against them by failing to appoint them to posts they had applied 
for, a decision that was informed by an EEP that was exclusively based on national 
demographics.285 Consequently, the court held that the DCS’s EEP was inconsistent with 
affirmative action measures contemplated by section 6(2) of the EEA.286 The DCS was ordered 
to consider both the national and regional economically active population profiles when setting 
employment equity targets in every unit or level of its workforce.287 
Moreover, the EEA affects employment prospects of people from non-’designated groups’ as its 
aim clearly states that its purpose is to advance appropriately qualified members from 
‘designated groups’.288 However, from the definition of ‘designated groups’, it is apparent that 
white females and disabled white males are members of ‘designated groups’ for the purposes of 
the EEA, with only physically able white males being excluded (the only non-designated group 
in the EEA).289 Most designated employers choose to overlook this consideration, resulting in 
race considerations overriding decisions when setting employment equity targets. One of the 
notable decisions that show the predicament faced by white people who qualify as members of 
‘designated groups’ but were overlooked based on representivity is the case of Solidarity obo 
Barnard.290 In this decision, the National Commissioner of the SAPS did not even consider 
Barnard’s gender and did not recognise her as a member of a designated group despite being a 
white female.291  
4.3.4  Inherent requirement of the job defence 
Section 6 of the EEA provides designated employers with both an affirmative action defence and 
an inherent requirement of the job defence when implementing employment equity.292 Section 
6(2) of the EEA reads as follows: 
(2) It is not unfair discrimination to-  
c) take affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose of this Act; or  
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d) distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent requirement of a job. 
 
An inherent requirement of the job defence plays a vital role in the EEA. This defence is one of 
the only ways in which members of non-designated groups may be protected from the impact of 
the concept of demographic representivity. What this means is that a designated employer, even 
when faced with rigid demographic statistics which needs to be fulfilled, can invoke the inherent 
requirements of the job defence where appropriate to prevent an unsuitable candidate from being 
recruited.293 
However, the inherent requirements of the job defence may also be detrimental in the South 
African Labour market because it constitutes a defence which justifies designated employers’ 
failure to achieve affirmative action in a way which promotes the achievement of equality as 
contemplated in the Constitution.294 Section 6(2) of the EEA places unfettered powers on 
designated employers to design requirements which they deem inherent and which are regarded 
to bring the job to a standstill if not fulfilled. Owing to the concept of demographic 
representivity’s use of racial proportions, race has been made an inherent requirement of the job. 
The idea of race as an inherent requirement of the job has been displayed in Solidarity obo 
Barnard,295 where Barnard, a white female officer was denied a promotion on the basis of 
representivity. Since white female police officers were overrepresented at salary level 9,296 it had 
become an inherent requirement of the job that an appropriate candidate to fill the post was 
supposed to be a member of an underrepresented race group. 
The inherent requirement of the job defence, not only affect people from non-designated groups 
but members of designated groups as well. In Naidoo,297 discussed numerous times above, an 
Indian female police officer was denied a promotion on the basis of both representivity and the 
operational requirements of the job. The SAPS considered Naidoo’s appointment to the post as 
detrimental to its provision of service delivery.298 The requirement of proportional race 
representation informed by national demographics, as well as the requirement of suitably 
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qualified workforce doubled Naidoo’s prejudice, displaying how invidious the invocation of the 
inherent requirements of the job can be in the South African labour market. 
4.4  Conclusion 
The enactment of the EEA was an important achievement of the legislature. The Act was an 
important piece of legislation in its attempt to avoid quotas in the South African labour market. 
However, the problem has been with the designated employers’ application and the courts’ 
interpretation of the prohibition against the use of quotas in the South African labour market. 
Some of the courts have condoned the use of quotas when they were disguised as numerical 
goals. The Constitutional court in Solidarity obo Barnard299 avoided answering an important 
question pertaining to whether quotas are permissible in the South African labour market. Thus, 
it can be inferred that the use of quotas has been legitimised as a permissible affirmative action 
measure as long they are disguised as numerical goals. Furthermore, the implementation of 
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CHAPTER 5: THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY AMENDMENT ACT 47 OF 2013 
 
5.1  Introduction 
In order to clarify the legal implications of the EEA of 1998, the EEAA was enacted and 
legalises the practice of quotas that was previously applied under the guise of numerical goals. 
Section 16 of the EEAA amends section 42 of the EEA301 and does away with considerations 
aimed at encouraging employment by merit.302 This chapter discusses what the thinking and 
motivation of the drafters of the EEAA might have been and the amendments pertaining to 
representivity as well as their legal and practical effects in the South African labour market. 
5.2  The thinking and motivation of the EEAA’s drafters 
The prime reason for drafting the EEAA was to fill in the gaps that were apparent in the EEA, 
but the thinking of the legislature can only remain a matter of speculation.303 However, an insight 
into the motivation and thinking behind the drafting of the EEAA may be provided for in the 
Memorandum on the Objects of the Employment Equity Amendment Bill of 2012304 as well as 
the substance of the EEAA’s amendments. The most disappointing part is that item 3 of the Bill 
fails to help comprehend the legislature’s motivation and thinking because it just paraphrases 
section 16 of the EEAA. Thus, it might as well be best for individuals to get insight into the 
motive of the EEAA’s amendments from the interpretation of section 16 of the Act.305 
The EEAA entrenches the notion of the degree of disadvantage in the South African labour 
market. Section 16 of the EEAA (replacing section 42 of the EEA) allows for the achievement of 
‘equitable representation of suitably qualified employees even amongst members of different 
‘designated groups’.306 The concept of the degree of disadvantage has been previously applied 
though not provided for in clear terms by legislation.307 The degree of disadvantage was 
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considered in Motala and Another v University of KwaZulu-Natal308 to benefit an African 
student applying for admission to university. Although this case was not in the employment 
context, the notion established in Motala309 was adopted in Fourie v Provincial Commissioner of 
the South African Police Service and Another,310 where the court affirmed that, while white 
females were also disadvantaged by apartheid, Africans were the most disadvantaged. The notion 
of the degree of disadvantage advances people in relation to the extent of discrimination they 
endured.311 Thus, it affirms that Africans should get first preference due to the severe 
discrimination they endured during the apartheid era, with Coloureds, Indians and Whites 
enjoying second, third and fourth preferences respectively. 
The following section discusses the EEAA’s provisions for representivity. 
5.3  The EEAA’s provisions for representivity 
Section 7 of the EEAA amends section 15 of the EEA, while section 16 of the EEAA substitutes 
section 42 of the EEAA as stated above. The discussion below is restricted to these substitutions 
and amendments pertaining to representivity. 
5.3.1  Section 7 of the EEAA 
Section 7(a) of the EEAA amends section 15 of the EEA by substituting subsection (1) with the 
following subsection:   
(1) Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from 
‘designated groups’ have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all 
occupational levels in the workforce of a designated employer [emphasis added].” 
 
Section 7(b) of the EEAA substitutes subsection 2(d)(i) of the EEA with the following 
subsection: 
i) ensure the ‘equitable representation’ of suitably qualified people from ‘designated groups’ in 
all occupational levels in the workforce [emphasis added].” 
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309 Ibid. 
310 (2004) 25 ILJ 1716 (LC) para F. 
311 See Fourie v South African Police Service and Another (note 214 above) para F. 
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The EEAA omitted reference to “categories” in amending section 15 of the EEA.312 The original 
wording included the phrase “all occupational categories and levels.”313 The motive behind the 
omission was to pave the way for the guidelines envisaged in section 16 of the EEAA read 
together with section 21 of the EEAA.314 Section 21 of the EEAA, which amends section 55 of 
the EEA, permits the Minister of Labour after consultation with the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) to issue regulations that should be used to assess 
designated employers’ compliance with the EEA.315 The new amendments have created a gap in 
the EEA that could cause chaos in the South African labour market, unless the Minister of 
Labour immediately issues regulations that guide the application of demographic representivity. 
The Draft Employment Equity Regulations of 2014 were supposed to provide guidelines to 
designated employers for determining which of the economically active population profiles to 
use in setting numerical targets, depending on the size of their workforce.316 However, 
stakeholders viewed the Draft Employment Equity Regulations317 with contempt because its 
proposed allocations were viewed as quota driven. Consequently, the Employment Equity 
Regulations318 were issued without guidelines for the application of demographic representivity. 
This made the situation worse than it was before the EEAA. 
5.3.2  Section 16 of the EEAA 
Section 42 of the EEA provided that the Director-General or person or body applying the Act in 
order to assess the compliance of designated employers with the Act “must” consider factors in 
section 42(a) to (e) in addition to those mentioned in section 15. However, section 42 of the EEA 
as amended by section 16 of the EEAA now provides that the Director-General, or person or 
body applying the Act for assessing designated employers’ compliance with the Act,319 “may” 
consider in addition to factors mentioned in section 15, the following factors:  
a) The extent to which suitably qualified people from and amongst the different ‘designated 
groups’ are equitably represented within each occupational level in that employer's 
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workforce in relation to the demographic profile of the national and regional 
economically active population: 
b) reasonable steps taken by a designated employer to train suitably qualified people from 
the ‘designated groups’; 
c) reasonable steps taken by a designated employer to implement its employment equity 
plan; 
d) the extent to which the designated employer has made progress in eliminating 
employment barriers that adversely affect people from ‘designated groups’; 
dA) reasonable steps taken by an employer to appoint and promote suitably qualified people 
from the ‘designated groups’; and 
e) any other prescribed factor.”  
Section 16 of the EEAA deletes subsections 1(a)(ii) to (v) in section 42 of the EEA, which 
required the complementing of representivity and the operational requirements of business 
enterprises.320 The amendments to section 42 of the EEA focus on the need to advance members 
of ‘designated groups’, disregarding the needs of business.321 Thus, employers are left without an 
excuse for failure to advance members of ‘designated groups’. Furthermore, the amendments 
allow for accommodation of members of ‘designated groups’ even though they may possess 
minimum skills required for the relevant job.322 Thus, the amendments pose problems in the 
South African labour market as merit is disregarded in favour of race imperatives. 
5.4  Practical effects of the EEAA’s provisions for representivity 
The EEAA’s provisions have caused uncertainty in the South African labour market.323 
Furthermore, they have implications for minority groups as well as the needs of business.  
5.4.1  Uncertainty 
The EEAA, just like its predecessor, the EEA, fails to provide the anticipated remedy for the 
quagmire in which the South African labour market is trapped. What the EEAA has done is to 
exacerbate the troubled situation in the labour market. The EEAA’s amendments give designated 
employers the option to choose any of the economically active population profiles to use.324 As 
noted above, section 16 of the EEAA deleted the word “must” in section 42(a) of the EEA and 
inserted the word “may”. Affording designated employers such an option nevertheless poses 
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problems in the labour market. A dispute concerning whether designated employers should use 
both the national and regional demographics when setting numerical targets under the EEA arose 
in Solidarity and Others.325 Rabkin-Naicker J ruled that the proper application of section 42 of 
the EEA required that designated employers when setting numerical targets should use both 
national and regional demographics.326 The reasoning was directed at advancing the majority of 
the black South African people in line with the constitutional obligation to achieve substantive 
‘equality’.327 However, the problem arises by providing employers with the choice of using any 
economically active population profile they see fit.328 More chaos will ensue since the 
regulations that were to serve as a guide to the application of demographic representivity were 
abandoned in the Employment Equity Regulations329 issued on 1 August 2014. 
5.4.2  The needs of business 
With the advent of the EEAA, merit is no longer a requirement in designated employers’ 
employment selection criteria.330 The consideration of a consortium of suitably qualified job 
aspirants from which a designated employer may choose is no longer required by the EEAA.331 
The EEAA’s amendments focus on the reasonable steps that designated employers should take to 
accommodate members of ‘designated groups’.332 Thus, designated employers are required to 
develop the skills of suitably qualified people from ‘designated groups’ who may possess 
minimal required skills.333 This results in the employment of less skilled employees.334  
The requirement to consider how other designated employers in the same sector are progressing 
with employment equity is no longer required.335 The exclusion of this requirement by the EEAA 
results in unrealistic expectations being heaped on designated employers. Moreover, the 
consideration of the number of jobs available in the designated employer’s occupational 
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categories and levels is left out.336 Also, the economic factors relevant to the circumstances of a 
particular designated employer are disregarded.337  
The abrogation of the above-mentioned considerations means that designated employers no 
longer have a reason for failure to implement employment equity, particularly the advancement 
of ‘designated groups’. Section 16 of the EEAA heightens race as the determining factor for 
appointment. This was the case in Solidarity obo Barnard,338 where the National Commissioner 
of SAPS sacrificed service delivery for the sake of advancing representivity. While quotas were 
disguised in numerical goals under the EEA, the EEAA through its provisions openly declares 
race classification as the determining factor for appointment.339  
5.4.3  Exclusion of minority groups from affirmative action benefits 
The notion of the degrees of disadvantage focusses on the advancement of groups that suffered 
the most disadvantage during the apartheid era,340 hence, the use of the national economically 
active population profile, of which the Africans constitute a majority.  
Substantive ‘equality’ requires all black South Africans to benefit equally from remedial 
measures.341 Notwithstanding that, the notion of the degrees of disadvantage also breaches the 
constitutional obligation to achieve substantive ‘equality’ in terms of section 9(2) of the 
Constitution. The underlying problem of the EEA was that most employers resorted to the use of 
regional demographics, which resulted in the employment of more Indian and Coloured 
employees in KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape respectively.342 The EEAA does not remedy the 
situation, but rather turns the tables. Indians and Coloureds, who once enjoyed the benefits of 
regional demographic representivity, would be disadvantaged if national demographics are used 
in setting numerical targets. In Munsamy,343 it was asserted that Indian and Coloured members of 
the SAPS in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape respectively would have to migrate to other 
                                                          
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Note 82 above, para 16. 
339 Note 25 above. 
340 See Motala and Another v University of KwaZulu-Natal (note 307 above) para 383C, D. 
341 Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Others (note 285 above) para 30 
342 Bradley Conradie “Employment Equity Act amendments -The detail behind the politics” Moneyweb 23 March 
2011, available at http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-soapbox/employment-equity-act-amendments--the-detail-
behin?sn=2009+Detail, accessed on 26 October 2014. 
343 Note 176 above, para 37. 
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provinces for promotions and employment prospects once the allocated race quotas are filled in 
their provinces. The EEAA is unconstitutional because it creates demarcations amongst 
‘designated groups’, which are in contravention of what the legislature contemplated in section 
9(2) of the Constitution.344 
5.5  Conclusion 
The EEAA abrogates the requirement to employ based on merit. The merit principle has been the 
foremost principle in maintaining a competent and a qualified workforce that boosts service 
delivery. However, group affiliations have now been made the determining factor for 
appointment. All the previous relevant considerations under the EEA have been repealed by the 
EEAA. The new developments have caused further implications with regard to the right to 
fairness in the South African labour market. While Africans are acknowledged as the first 
preferred beneficiaries of affirmative action, Indians and Coloureds are demeaned to second and 
third class citizens. Moreover, the EEAA’s affirmative action policy by omission reduces white 
people to fourth-class citizens. The EEAA has diverted most of the affirmative action measures 
to benefit Africans. This diversion is detrimental to members of other ‘designated groups’ who 
are less preferred as well as members of non-’designated groups’. While the exclusion of white 
people can be justified on the basis of substantive ‘equality’, the exclusion of other ‘designated 








                                                          
344 Note 39 above. 
Page | 56  
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1  Conclusions  
Drawing on the analysis developed in the various chapters, it may be concluded that the concept 
of demographic representivity as provided for in terms of both the EEA and the EEAA is 
contrary to the obligation imposed by the Constitution to provide every person the right to 
‘equality’. Rather, the concept is deeply rooted in a quest to ensure that everyone attains the 
same outcome.345 This is contrary to the whole essence of substantive ‘equality’, which 
recognises the difference in people’s circumstances and therefore the need to empower 
disadvantaged members of society.346 What the concept of demographic representivity seeks to 
achieve is to make people ends in themselves.347 This creates apartheid type demarcations where 
people who are equal in dignity are grouped according to their race and gender. This results in a 
situation where the empowerment of any race or gender group leads to the denigration of other 
race or gender groups.348 The quota driven motive of the concept of demographic representivity 
is far from the objective of promoting the ‘equality’ which it claims to achieve. Thus, it has been 
demonstrated that the concept of demographic representivity is an unconstitutional affirmative 
action measure.349 
This dissertation provides a challenge to South African government policy in respect of 
demographic representivity, a widespread mechanism of affirmative action. The dissertation 
makes a contribution in that it comments on new legislation which has not been commented 
much on previously, namely, the EEAA. In addition, it takes a novel approach to the concept of 
demographic representivity. As stated in 1.2 above, most of the literature on demographic 
representivity has been based on the practicality of the concept per se,350 without, however, 
challenging its constitutionality. This dissertation seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the 
concept of demographic representivity as it applies in the South African labour market. It is 
suggested that, in order to address the issue, the government could pursue other options, such as 
                                                          
345 Louw (note 24 above) 343. 
346 Note 39 above. 
347 S v Makwanyane and Another (note 116 above) para 26.   
348 Louw (note 24 above) 343. 
349 See section 2.3 in Chapter 2.  
350 See Louw (note 24 above) 338.   
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furthering the education and skills of people from previously disadvantaged groups,351 rather 
than making people from non-designated groups a means to an end in the affirmative action 
equation.  
To that effect the provisions on affirmative action in terms of the EEA should be amended and 
the EEAA’s provisions for representivity should be repealed. Section 2 which is the aim of the 
EEA contradicts section 9 of the Constitution. The constitutional standard of ‘equality’ should be 
maintained at all cost. Section 2 of the EEA brings in a new requirement of ‘equitable 
representation’ and which results in the implementation of quotas. To solve this issue, the aim of 
the EEA has to be brought in line with the standard set in section 9 of the Constitution. The 
definition of affirmative action measures in terms of both the EEA and the EEAA has to be 
amended to conform to the definition of affirmative action measures provided for in terms of the 
Constitution. 
In terms of future research, the study could be a starting point for questions about demographic 
representivity as it affects other areas of government policy such as the Black Economic 
Empowerment policy (BEE) which is empowered by the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act (BEEA).352 These important questions could raise public awareness of the 
misconception that affirmative action is a right. The members of society are only entitled to the 
right to be treated equally and affirmative action can be seen as a privilege which no one has a 
right to claim.353 
As Dr Mamphela Ramphele has written: 
“Society has a responsibility to create an equitable framework but successful performance under 
such conditions is the responsibility of individuals. The right to equal opportunities does not 




                                                          
351 Cohen and Moodley (note 41 above) 325.   
352 Act 53 of 2003. 
353 M McGregor “Affirmative action – a defence or a right? (2003) 11 SA Merc LJ 164, 167. 
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